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I. Introduction 
 There is a great deal of literature providing evidence establishing both short sellers and 
option traders as "informed" investors. The information contained in option trades is often 
viewed as evidence of non-redundancy and suggests that the options market contains information 
not present in the equities market, which includes short selling. However, relatively little is 
known about the relation between short selling and options traders, and even less is known about 
the dynamic relation. In this paper, we empirically investigate the dynamic relation between 
aggregate monthly short interest, option open interest, the ratio of option volume to stock 
volume, and equity returns for S&P 500 firms using methodology based on Sims (1972).  
We focus on three issues:  
1) Are short selling and option trading substitutes or complements? 
2) Does aggregate option trading add to market completeness (i.e., is the options market 
non-redundant)? 
3) Who is relatively more informed between short sellers and option traders?   
The first issue, whether short selling and option trading are complements or substitutes, 
has been addressed frequently in the literature. However, a consensus has not been reached and 
previous methodologies may not be reliable. The assumption of substitutability is commonly 
made in the extant literature that examines the effect of short sale constraints on the 
(over)valuation of stocks. Some argue, following Miller (1977), that in an environment of 
heterogeneous beliefs about a stock's value, optimists will purchase the stock and pessimists will 
short the stock. If short sale constraints are present, however, the optimists will have a larger 
impact on the stock's price and thus cause overvaluation. In their model, Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) agree that options reduce short selling costs, but disagree that short sale 
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constraints necessarily bias prices upward. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) also propose that 
unexpected short selling is indicative of bad news, which is empirically confirmed by Aitken, 
Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998).  
 There has been further empirical evidence (e.g., Sorescu (2000) and Danielsen and 
Sorescu (2001)), which shows post-1980 stock prices decline upon option introduction. This 
seems to confirm a relaxation of short sale constraints and suggests pessimistic investors 
substituting options for shorting (by either buying puts or writing calls). Consistent with Miller's 
predictions, Phillips (2011) finds options alleviate a majority of pricing inefficiencies between 
constrained and unconstrained stocks, but only with respect to negative news (i.e., no efficiency 
gains are present with positive news). Accordingly, analyses such as Boehme, Danielsen, and 
Sorescu (2006) explicitly use stock option status as an indicator of lessened short sale 
constraints.  
 Yet, not all studies are consistent in revealing shorting and options as substitutes. For 
example, Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007) document non-market maker 
investors are net writers of options, with the majority of their open interest in call options. Evans, 
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2009) provide evidence that option market makers, as counterparties to 
investors who are synthetically shorting, hedge their inherently long position by shorting the 
stock. Additionally, Battalio and Schultz (2006) and Blau and Brough (2011b) find no evidence 
of substitutability between short sales and bearish option trades. These findings place short 
selling and option markets not as substitutes, but rather as complements:  higher option trading 
activity would coincide with higher short selling, but, according to hedging argument, not 
necessarily vice versa.  
  3 
 
 Given that Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) find informed traders operate in the equities 
market, and Danielsen, van Ness, and Warr (2007) find the market quality of the underlying 
security improves prior to option listing, an argument can be made that increased short selling, in 
conjunction with option activity, drives the results of Sorescu (2000) and Danielsen and Sorescu 
(2001). Additionally, D'Avolio (2002), Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) and Boehmer, Jones, 
and Zhang (2008) demonstrate that the vast majority of stocks are not short-sale constrained, 
thus there is little motivation for the short seller to migrate to options. Battalio and Schultz 
(2011) and Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2012) notice volume and liquidity decreased for 
options on stocks that fell under the U.S. SEC's September, 2008 short sale ban, and show it is 
difficult to switch strategies from short selling to options trading when market makers are 
uncertain about their ability to hedge.  Furthermore, Blau and Brough (2011a) find that short 
selling activity is endogenous to the decision to list the stock on an options exchange, as market 
makers who trade options want the ability to easily short equities in their delta hedging activities. 
These findings make previous event studies establishing substitutability by associating option 
listing decisions and subsequent stock returns questionable.  
Prior literature focuses on static tests such as an event study methodology to examine 
option exchange listings. We focus on stocks that have options traded on them and use dynamic 
tests that avoid the problems of endogeneity faced by previous studies to examine the relations 
between the substitutability between short sales and option open interest over time. Contrary to 
the findings of event studies around option listings, our results show that options and short 
trading are complements rather than substitutes. This result is consistent with the literature 
demonstrating that relatively few stocks are short sale constrained, which thus limits the need to 
substitute in the options market.  
  4 
 
The second issue we consider is the information provided by the options market. 
Specifically, given that short selling and options are not found to be substitutes (i.e., informed 
traders are not leaving the equities market to participate in the options market), it is not apparent 
that option markets add information about the equities market. Some evidence suggests that the 
options market is redundant. Stephan and Whaley (1990) and Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993) 
use intraday data to show that the equities market leads the options market and that the options 
market does not add additional information. Muravyev, Pearson, and Broussard (2012) also use 
intraday data to demonstrate the option market offers no additional price discovery beyond what 
is available in the equities market. Similarly, Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) show that stock 
volume, but not option volume, has predictive power for returns, suggesting the options market 
does not contain any information not already reflected in the market for the underlying securities.  
Other studies show that the options market is non-redundant. Black (1975), Manaster, 
and Rendleman (1982), Figlewski and Webb (1993), Buraschi and Jackwerth (2001), Vanden 
(2004, 2006), and Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) either theoretically show or empirically 
demonstrate the option market is non-redundant to the equities market, and contains information 
not contemporaneously incorporated in the stock market.
1
  Consequently, the options market is 
thought to provide price discovery that is incremental to that of the underlying equities market.  
Many studies provide evidence for option market non-redundancy by showing the option 
market has the ability to predict future stock returns, and thus contains informed traders not 
acting in the equities market. For example, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) demonstrate that 
buyer-initiated versus seller initiated option volume is able to predict stock returns. Similarly, 
Pan and Poteshman (2006) provide evidence that initiated put volume relative to call volume has 
                                                          
1
 Black (1975) reasons that the natural leverage provided by options provides an attractive arena for informed traders 
to act on their information.  Additionally, Easley et al. (1998) show that there can exist a pooling equilibrium where 
informed traders will prefer to execute information in the options market. 
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explanatory power over future stock returns, and that option traders possess nonpublic 
information. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010) and Johnson and So (2012) demonstrate 
the return predictability of option to stock trading volume ratio also suggests options traders are 
informed. Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) find that the average contribution of the 
options market to price discovery is about 17%. Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004), Bali 
and Hovakimian (2009), Cremers and Weinbaum (2010), and Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2010) 
demonstrate option put-call parity or implied volatilities can predict future stock returns.
2
   
 Related to the issue of redundancy is the third issue addressed in our paper. Specifically, 
we ask whether short sellers or option traders are relatively more informed. While there is some 
debate about the information contained in the options market as discussed above, extant literature 
makes a good case for short sellers being sophisticated investors and superior processors of 
information. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) explain investors would not short sell for liquidity 
reasons since the proceeds from the short sale are not available for use by the investors. 
Therefore, the majority of short sales should be informed and not noise trades. Supporting this 
assertion, Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) demonstrate short sellers trade against 
firms whose fundamental ratios do not support their price. Drake, Rees, and Swanson (2011) find 
similar evidence of short sellers trading based on firm fundamentals, and show short sellers 
outperform analysts in this regard.
3
  Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) also find short sellers are 
contrarian with respect to momentum, selling stock after past positive returns.  
                                                          
2
 Additionally, Patell and Wolfson (1981), Barone-Adesi, Brown, and Harlow (1994), Levy and Yoder (1993), 
Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal (2001), Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005), and Jin, Livnat, and Zhang (2012) find that 
option markets can predict the content of earnings announcements as well as corporate events such as merger 
announcements and probability of merger completion.  Furthermore, Cao et al. find option volume imbalances are 
proportional to takeover premiums. 
3
 Many other studies find short sellers profit from accounting-based information, establishing them as advanced 
information processors, including Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman (2006). 
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Several studies, such as Asquith and Meulbroek (1995), Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal 
(2001), Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002), Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 
(2008), and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), show an inverse relation between short sales and 
future returns, indicating short sellers can predict stock returns. Furthermore, Safieddine and 
Wilhelm (1996), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010), Karpoff and Lou (2010), and Liu and 
Swanson (2012) find short sellers anticipate events such as earnings surprises, financial 
misconduct, analyst downgrades, credit rating downgrades, mergers, repurchases, and seasoned 
equity offerings. Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) and Henry and Koski (2010) suggest short 
sellers are "tipped off" or engage in price manipulation, but Drake, Rees, and Swanson (2011), 
Blau and Pinegar (2012), and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) find short sellers are 
skilled at information processing, and Boehmer and Wu (2012) demonstrate short selling is 
contrarian and important to the price discovery process.  
 While studies such as Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) and Muravyev, Pearson, and 
Broussard (2012) show price discovery occurs in the equities market and not necessarily in the 
options market, they do not explore short sales. We hypothesize that,  if option traders act 
independently of or before short sellers, this would indicate informed traders engaging in the 
options market and supports the theory of non-redundancy. On the other hand, if option traders 
simply follow the lead of short sellers, then the short sellers are the more informed traders acting 
in the equities market, and this suggests the options market is not adding any completeness to the 
equities market and rejects non-redundancy.  
  The results of our dynamic analysis indicate that aggregate option open interest follows 
aggregate returns and short interest. This suggests that, in aggregate, options open interest 
contains little information about future equity returns and the options market is redundant. 
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However, we find that Roll et al.'s (2011) ratio of dollar option volume to dollar stock volume, 
which includes important price information about options, leads both aggregate returns and 
aggregate short selling. Thus, when considering both option prices and activity, we find that the 
options market is informed and non-redundant. Finally, we find that short traders are generally 
backward-looking and respond to past negative return performance with increased short activity 
(e.g., momentum traders). Once past returns are controlled for, aggregate short trading is unable 
to add predictive ability for future returns. Collectively, our results suggest that short sellers are 
not particularly informed in aggregate while option traders are relatively more informed. In 
general, the results in our paper are sensitive to the use of levels or first-differences of variables 
and to the inclusion of price information for options. The conclusions discussed above relate to 
tests that appropriately control for nonstationarity and cointegration. Differences in results are 
discussed in the robustness section.    
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the data and 
variables. Section III discusses how to investigate whether options and short trading are 
complements or substitutes and how to test whether short traders and option traders are informed 
traders based on potential information asymmetry between these traders and other investors.  
Section IV presents the empirical findings. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. Data and Methodology   
 
 We obtain returns and outstanding shares for Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) Index 
firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We focus on S&P 500 firms in an 
effort to create a sample with relatively homogenous short sale constraints. Additionally, this 
sample allows us to conduct robustness tests based on index level options. Monthly short interest 
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ratios for each firm comes from the NYSE and Nasdaq exchanges, where the short interest ratio 
for firm i in month t (SIRi,t) is defined as: 
       
                 
                      
  
 
The short interest ratios for each firm in the S&P 500 are then aggregated by market 
capitalization into a single short interest ratio, SIRt.  
Optionmetrics Ivy DB provides the open interest, volume, and bid/ask prices across put 
and call contracts for each firm. We first focus on open interest in an effort to use an analogous 
measure to short interest. The information content of open interest is in question, however, since 
the literature has, to the best of our knowledge, not established a robust predictive ability of 
option open interest with respect to future returns.
4
 The call (OIRCt) and put (OIRPt) open 
interest ratios across all call and put options for each firm are constructed as follows: 
           
 
 
∑
                                   
                      
 
   
    
 
where D equals the number of trading days in month t. Each firm’s open interest ratio is then 
aggregated each month by market capitalization to form the ratio. We use open interest because 
it reflects all open option contracts on the underlying, which is conceptually similar to the 
number of outstanding shares contemporaneously sold short in the SIR measure.    
 Although an analogous measure to SIR, since open interest is not established as a strong 
predictor of future returns, it may be a weak measure of information contained in the options 
market. Thus, we additionally run tests using the option to stock volume ratio (O/S), which is 
                                                          
4
 Safieddine and Wilhelm (1996) show open interest can predict seasoned equity offerings, and Jayaraman, Frye, 
and Sabherwal (2001) find it has predictive ability over mergers, but neither study establishes that open interest 
contains general predictability of returns. 
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recently identified by Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010) and Johnson and So (2012) as 
having a strong negative relation with future returns, and thus presumably contains information 
not incorporated in the equities market.
5
  Similar to the negative relation between short interest 
and future returns, the relation between O/S and future returns is indicative of informed trading. 
Following Roll et al. (2010), we define O/S of firm i in month t as: 
   
       
                           
                           
  
where the total monthly dollar options volume for each firm is computed by multiplying the total 
contracts traded in each option by the end-of-day quote midpoints, aggregating across all options 
listed on the firm over the month, and multiplying that value by 100 to account for the 
convention that each contract represents 100 equity shares. The total dollar share volume is 
calculated by multiplying the closing price of the stock each day by the number of daily shares 
traded and aggregating over the month. The option-to-stock volume ratios for each firm in the 
S&P 500 are then aggregated each month by market capitalization into a single option-to-stock 
volume ratio, O/St. 
 Our aggregate short interest, option open interest, and O/S measures contain only firms 
that have options traded on them. Thus, the aggregate value does not include all S&P 500 firms. 
As an unreported robustness check, we have conducted all analyses using data for S&P 500 
index options and including all S&P 500 stocks in our short interest aggregation. The results, 
while generally similar to those reported, are not included as they do not provide for a true test of 
complements versus substitutes. Specifically, stocks with no option activity clearly have no 
                                                          
5
 As a robustness check, we also examine call-put volatility spreads of SPX (S&P 500) index options weighted by 
open interest.  These unreported results are qualitatively similar to those using open interest (except where noted 
otherwise in the text).  SPX options are used because the requirement of having call/put pairs at the same strike 
prices severely reduces the number of individual firms available to use in the sample.  The O/S measure does not 
have such a requirement, thus all S&P 500 firms with options traded on their stock are in the sample. 
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relation between short interest and option activity and the inclusion of such firms would cloud 
our analysis. Based on the availability of option and short interest data, our sample covers the 
period 1996-2009. 
 
III. Empirical Methods  
 
To address the issues discussed above, we develop an empirical framework that helps us 
test whether short selling and option trading are complements or substitutes and whether short 
sellers and option traders are informed traders.  
 
3.1. Short sales and option trading: Substitutes or complements? 
 
To see whether short interest (SIR) and option trades (OIR: open interest of calls or puts) 
are complements or substitutes, we look at the dynamic relation between the two variables using 
the following regressions:   
      (1) 
     (2) 
In equations (1) and (2), we include the contemporaneous OIR and SIR, respectively. If 
the null hypothesis, H0 :  , is rejected and is negative (positive) in (1), then open 
interest of calls (or puts) is substituting (complementing) short interest. That is, in this analysis 
we focus on the (cumulative) net effect of a variable on the dependent variable provided by the 
1 0
,
m m
t j t j j t j
j j
SIR SIR OIR   
 
   
1 0
.
m m
t j t j j t j
j j
OIR OIR SIR   
 
   
0
0
m
j
j



0
m
j
j



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sum of the coefficients for current and lagged variables to tell whether two variables are 
substitutes or complements.  Similarly, if the null hypothesis, H0 :  , is rejected and 
is negative (positive) in (2), then short interest is substituting (complementing) open 
interest of calls (or puts).  
 
3.2. Informed short sellers and two-sided regression-based causality tests (Sims test) 
In this section, we provide a simple, parsimonious time-series model in which there is 
information asymmetry between potentially informed short sellers (or option traders) and other 
uninformed investors. In such a case, short-sale (or option trading) decisions may contain (or 
convey) new information about future stock returns. In fact, some short-sale (or option trading) 
decisions may be information events (i.e., forward-looking), while others may be non-
information events (i.e., backward-looking) with respect to stock returns. The short-sale (or 
option trading) decision will be related to future stock returns when it is an informative event 
under information asymmetry. The idea is that, although informed short sellers (or option traders) 
and other uninformed investors observe the same financial variables such as current and past 
stock returns and fundamentals, other uninformed investors may not recover all the information 
that short sellers (or option traders) use in short sales (or option trading).
6
 Our model is very 
useful because it provides a regression model that tests the predictive power of short sales (or 
option trading) under potential information asymmetry. 
                                                          
6
 We capture this intuition in a time-series concept of the non-invertibility of the moving average representation (see 
Box and Jenkins (1976, p.69) and Granger and Newbold (1986, p.145)). 
0
0
m
j
j



0
m
j
j



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Here we utilize a theorem in time-series econometrics, which states that any time-series 
process has both invertible and non-invertible representations (see Fuller, 1976 (pages 64-66, 
Theorem 2.6.4)). Although stock returns, Rt, may follow a general autoregressive moving-
average (i.e., ARMA(p,q)) process, for expositional simplicity, we assume that other uninformed 
investors, observing current and past stock returns, infer a first-order (invertible) moving 
average, MA(1) (i.e., ARMA (0,1)), process of the returns:
 
 
 
               Rt = (1 –  L) ut,         < 1.0 ,                                        (3) 
where Rt is the stock return at time t, L is the lag (or backshift) operator (i.e., L
n 
Rt = Rt-n), and ut 
is white noise with var(ut) = u
2
. The autocovariance functions (ACFs) for this MA(1) return 
process are:
 7
 
 
var(Rt) = (1 + 
2
) u
2
, 
cov(Rt, Rt-1) = -  u
2
, 
cov(Rt, Rt-k) = 0, for k  2.                                 (4) 
On the other hand, suppose that informed short sellers (or option traders), observing the 
same current and past stock returns, infer the following (non-invertible) MA(1) process of the 
returns: 
            Rt = (1 – 
-1
 L) vt,        < 1.0 ,                              (5) 
where vt is white noise with var(vt) = v
2
. The ACFs for this MA(1) return process are: 
                                                          
7
 For expositional simplicity, we use an MA(1) model of the return process. Any higher order representation of 
returns yields the same dynamic relations with more complicated computations.   
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var(Rt) = (1 + 
-2
) v
2
, 
cov(Rt, Rt-1) = - 
-1
 v
2
, 
cov(Rt, Rt-k) = 0, for k  2.                                (6) 
It is noted that if we set v
2
  = 2 u
2
, then the ACFs in (4) and (6) are identical. Since the 
return process can be identified in practice by the observed ACFs, the identical ACFs imply that 
stock return processes in (3) and (5) represent the same return process. That is, for a given return 
process, uninformed investors and informed short sellers (or option traders) may infer different 
MA(1) processes.
8
    
In addition, it is noted that v
2
 is smaller than u
2
 :  
 
v
2
  < u
2
 .          (7) 
 
This is because  v
2
  =  2 u
2
  and < 1.0. This means that the variance of the one-step-ahead 
forecast error of the return process in (5) by informed short sellers (i.e., v
2
 ) would be smaller 
than the corresponding variance of the return process in (3) by other uninformed investors (i.e., 
u
2
). However, unlike the ut process, the vt process cannot be fully recovered by other 
uninformed investors from the information about current and past values of stock returns because 
the process is not invertible. That is, although both short sellers and other uninformed investors 
observe the same (current and past) returns, under information asymmetry, informed short sellers 
with a larger information set, t
*
 = {Rt-j, vt-j, ut-j, for j  0}, can forecast future returns better than 
other uninformed investors with a smaller information set, t = {Rt-j, ut-j, for j  0}. 
                                                          
8
 The return process in (3) with innovation ut is an invertible MAR because the root of the determinant of the MAR 
of Rt is greater than 1 (i.e., det [1- z] = 0, for z = 
-1
). However, the return process with the innovations vt in (5) is a 
non-invertible MAR because the root of the determinant is less than 1 (i.e., det [1- -1 z] = 0, for z = ). 
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We obtain an important alternative insight by comparing the corresponding autoregressive 
representations (ARR) of the moving average representations (MAR) of stock return processes 
{Rt} in (3) and (5):   
 
Note that the innovations {ut} in the other uninformed investors’ return process are backward-
looking, whereas the innovations {vt} in the informed short sellers’ return process are forward-
looking.
9
   
How is this information asymmetry between informed short sellers and other uninformed 
investors related to the dynamic relation between short sales and stock returns (i.e., the predictive 
power of short sales)?  Suppose that short sellers have an informational advantage in that they 
can forecast the firm’s future prospects (or overvaluation) better than other uninformed investors 
by observing vt. If informed short sellers use this information in their short-sale decisions, their 
short sales (or short interest ratio, SIRt) will be a function of innovation vt that they observe but 
other uninformed investors do not:   
 
  
Then, by using vt in (8), short interest and stock return processes will be related as follows:  
                                                          
9
 The innovations {ut} are represented by a square summable linear combination of current and past values of the 
Rt’s (i.e., ut lies in the space spanned by current and lagged Rt’s ). However, the innovations {vt} are represented by 
a square summable linear combination of future values of Rt’s (i.e., vt lies in the space spanned by future Rt’s ). This 
is because if we solve the relation in (8) backwards, the right-hand side is not square summable. 
1 -1 -1 -1 1 j
t t t t j
j 1
v (1  L)  R    -(  L )(1  L )  R   R . (8)   

 


     




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0j
jt
j
t
1
t and,R RL) (1u 
i 2
t t i t i t-i
i 0 i 0 i 0
f (v )  (  L ) v   v ,  with  . (9)iSIR   
  
  
      
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where  for j = -∞, …, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, ….∞ is a function of  and . That is, the informed short 
sales will be a linear combination of future, current, and past returns; thus, they will be forward-
looking.
10
  
In contrast, suppose that short sellers do not have an informational advantage or they 
simply do not make short-sale decisions based on their informational advantage. Then, the 
uninformed short sales will be a function of the innovation that other uninformed investors 
observe, ut: 
  
Then, by using ut in (8), uninformed short sales and stock return processes will be related as 
follows: 
                                                          
10
 In practice, since short sellers do not have perfect foresights, (10) will be  
1
t j t j t j t j
j 0 j -
   R  +  E [   R  ].                                                             (10)'       SIR  
 
 
  
  
 
 
j i
j
i i 1
t i t i t
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where for k = 0, 1, 2, ….∞ is a function of  and . That is, in this case, the uninformed 
short sales will only reflect the past and current returns and will not be related to future returns; 
thus, they will be backward-looking. To summarize, we have shown that under information 
asymmetry, informed (or informative) short sales (or short interests) are related not only to past 
and current returns but also to future returns. In contrast, in the absence of information 
asymmetry, uninformed (or non-informative) short sales (or short interests) are not related to 
future returns.  
A practical question is how we distinguish between the two types of short sales (or short 
interests): informative and non-informative. When an investor engages in a short sale, if it 
contains new information about future prospects of the firm (i.e., stock returns) that is not 
contained in the current and past values of returns and short sales, it is an informative (i.e., 
forward-looking) short sale and it is related to future returns. Otherwise, it is a non-informative 
(i.e., backward-looking) short sale. We can empirically test whether short-sale decisions are 
informative or not by using the following proposition. 
The equivalence of the two-sided regression in (10) with Granger (1969) causality has 
been established by Sims (1972, Theorem 2), which we restate in our context: 
Proposition 1. Consider the following two-sided regression:   
                                                                                         (13) 
where E(εt. Rt-j) = 0 for all j (= -m. …-1, 0, 1,… m). If the null hypothesis that all the 
coefficients of future returns are zero (i.e.,  = 0 for all j < 0 ) is rejected, then  
Granger-causes Rt.  
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,
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That is, we can use the two-sided regression as a means of testing the predictability of short 
sales for market returns, and the finding of the predictive power of short sales can be interpreted 
based on information asymmetry. The intuition behind this test is that including lagged values of 
market returns helps us control for potential feedback in short-sale decisions.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
4.1. Nonstationary variables 
 
In Table 1 we examine the stationarity of the various option and short interest variables 
used in our analysis. If a variable is non-stationary, the first-difference of the variable is needed. 
However, using the first-difference in a variable that is already stationary is not desirable (i.e., a 
potential over-differencing issue which could lead to less stable coefficient estimates). Thus, it is 
important to carefully identify the stationarity of each variable. The results of our Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests can be found in Table 1. We 
find that SIRt, OIRPt, and OIRCt are all nonstationary series, while RETURN and O/S series are 
stationary. This implies that we need to use the first-differenced series of these nonstationary 
variables in our analysis. When we consider a linear combination of these nonstationary series, 
these residuals (i.e., linear combinations) are stationary.  This implies that a linear combination 
of SIRt and OIRPt (i.e., RESPt), that of SIRt and OIRCt (i.e., RESCt), and that of SIRt, OIRPt and 
OIRCt (RES3t) are cointegrated. That is, we find RESPt, RESCt, and RES3t are stationary. Given 
the observed cointegration, a VECM (vector error correction model) with an error correction 
term, which is a linear combination of cointegrated variables, is used when these variables are 
included. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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4.2. Short sales and option trading: Substitutes or complements? 
The issue of whether short selling and option activity are complements or substitutes has 
been addressed by the literature without reaching a consensus. It is possible that options may 
alleviate short sale constraints and allow investors an alternative (i.e., substitute) method of 
acting on pessimistic sentiment. However, most stocks are not found to be short sale constrained 
and pessimistic positions may be taken in both the equities and options market.  
Table 2 displays the results testing whether options and shorts are complements or 
substitutes. In this analysis we focus on the (cumulative) net effect of a variable on the dependent 
variable provided by the sum of the coefficients for current and lagged variables as discussed in 
Section 3.1 with equations (1) and (2). In general, there is strong evidence of options and short 
activity serving as complements for one another. When we focus on relations significant at a 
minimum of the 10% level we find: 
1) OIRP and OPIRC are neither a substitute nor a complement to SIR. 
2) SIR complements OIRP and OIRC. 
3) OIRC complements OIRP and OIRP complements OIRC. 
4) Levels of OIRP and OIRC complement levels of SIR, and levels of SIR 
complement levels of OIRP and OIRC. 
5) Levels of OIRC complement levels of OIRP, and levels of OIRP complement 
levels of OIRC. 
6) O/S is neither a substitute nor a complement to SIR, and SIR is neither a 
substitute nor a complement to O/S.  
  
  
   
 
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Thus, our results are consistent with option and short interest serving as complements for one 
another. Our results are inconsistent with the suggestion that options and shorts serve as 
substitutes due to option introduction relieving short sale constraints. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
4.3. Tests of informedness based on Sims (1972) bivariate, two-sided regression 
The literature is mixed with respect to the information contained in option trading. Some 
evidence suggests that options activity is redundant and does not contain information in addition 
to that found in equities while other evidence suggests that option activity can be used to predict 
returns. While short sellers are generally considered to be informed, a comparison of the relative 
information contained by short sellers versus option traders has, to our knowledge, not been 
addressed. In Table 3 we directly test which of the various groups (short sellers and option 
traders) are relatively more informed. We do so using Sims (1972) two-sided regression based 
causality tests in (13).  
In Table 3, Panels A through D, we use bivariate models with first-differenced SIR, 
OIRP, OIRC, and levels of O/S as short interest and option variables and RETURN for the return 
variable. In all panels we test both the joint and cumulative (net) effect of the variables of 
interest. If the null hypothesis that the coefficients of past returns are zero as a group is rejected, 
it implies that past returns Granger-cause the other variable (i.e., SIR or OIR or O/S). If the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of future returns are zero as a group is rejected, it implies that the 
other variable (i.e., SIR or OIR or O/S) Granger-causes returns, and we can interpret this as 
evidence of an informed decision by short sales (or option trades) as we have discussed above in 
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Section 3.2. The t-test for the sum of the lagged (or future) coefficients tests if the direction (i.e., 
positive or negative) of the causal relation is significant. 
The results in Panel A of Table 3 indicate that RETURN Granger-causes SIR and the 
effect is negative and significant (at the 1% level). Thus, consistent with expectations, higher 
returns result in lower short interest. SIR is found to Granger-cause returns but the direction of 
the effect is insignificantly positive. The combined results suggest that while short sellers 
increase short activity in response to lower returns, they are not well informed investors in that 
their increased short activity does not anticipate lower future returns. Instead, short sellers seem 
to be backward-looking momentum traders responding to past returns. 
In Panel B of Table 3 we find that RETURN Granger-causes OIRP with a marginally 
significant positive effect. However, OIRP does not Granger-cause returns. This suggests that 
put activity increases in response to higher returns and put traders are not informed investors as 
their increased put activity is not in anticipation of significantly lower future returns. Rather, they 
seem to be backward-looking investors responding to higher recent returns. The positive relation 
may be due to investors essentially purchasing insurance via put options, locking in recently 
acquired paper gains.  
Panel C of Table 3 shows that RETURN Granger-causes OIRC with a marginal positive 
effect, and OIRC does not Granger-cause returns. This implies that call activity increases 
marginally in response to higher returns, and call traders are not well informed investors in that 
their increased call activities are not in anticipation of significantly higher future returns. Rather, 
they seem to be backward-looking investors marginally responding to past recent higher returns. 
In Panel D of Table 3, RETURN Granger-causes O/S with a statistically significant 
negative net effect, and O/S Granger-causes RETURN with a statistically significant negative net 
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effect. Thus, there is a feedback relation between O/S and RETURN. The results indicate that O/S 
helps better predict future returns and that, although options traders appear to be momentum 
traders, they are, on average and in aggregate, informed investors. 
  
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
4.4. Tests of informedness based on multivariate causality tests 
The bivariate analysis in Table 3 is conducted using the two-sided regression causality 
tests developed by Sims (1972), which we relate to potential information asymmetry.  However, 
it does not provide lags of the dependent variable or include more than one variable of interest at 
a time. To further test causal relations based on multiple variables, in Table 4, we add both to our 
causality tests, which become usual multivariable causality tests.  
In the expanded model in Panel A of Table 4, we find SIR does not Granger-cause 
returns, while OIRP and OIRC Granger-cause returns. OIRP (OIRC) anticipates positive 
(negative) stock returns, which suggests both activities are not well informed or that non-market 
makers are net writers of calls and are informed. Panel B of Table 4 displays results that indicate 
RETURN Granger-causes SIR with a marginally significant negative effect. This implies that 
short sales are responding to lower stock returns, which is consistent with Panel A of Table 3. 
OIRP and OIRC do not Granger-cause SIR, which implies that neither put nor call activities lead 
to short sale activities. Overall, while neither OIRP nor OIRC has the power to predict SIR, SIR 
activities increases in response to lower stock returns (i.e., backward-looking activities).  
In Panel C of Table 4, we find that RETURN Granger-causes OIRP with a positive 
cumulative effect (significant at the 1% level), which is consistent with Panel B of Table 3, 
implying that put activities are responding to higher stock returns. SIR Granger-causes OIRP 
  22 
 
with a positive effect, which implies that short sale activities lead put activities or put activities 
tend to follow higher short sales.  While OIRC Granger-causes OIRP with a negative effect, its 
net effect is not significant. In Panel D of Table 4, we see that RETURN Granger-causes OIRC 
with a marginally significant positive net effect. This implies that call activities respond to higher 
stock returns. SIR Granger-causes OIRC with a marginally positive net effect, which implies that 
short sale activities lead call activities or call activities tend to weakly follow higher short sales. 
However, put activities do not have any predictive power for call activities. Overall, indicative of 
a complementary relation, call activities tend to respond to higher stock returns and weakly 
follow higher short sale activities.  
In Panel E of Table 4, SIR Granger-causes RETURN (i.e., significant joint test) though 
the net effect is not significant. O/S Granger-causes RETURN with a significant net negative 
effect as in the two-sided regressions in Panel D of Table 3. In Panel F, RETURN Granger-causes 
SIR with a significant negative net effect. O/S does not Granger-cause SIR. In Panel G, neither 
RETURN nor SIR Granger-causes O/S. Overall, these three panels indicate that O/S contains 
information about future returns, while SIR does not. SIR responds to past RETURN, but O/S 
does not. Thus, option traders appear to be informed about future stock returns while short sellers 
are backward-looking. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
4.5. Tests of informedness based on bivariate models 
While the literature has provided evidence that suggests that both short interest and 
option activity may be informed, the question of which group is relatively more informed 
remains unanswered. Our results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with option traders being 
relatively more informed. In Table 5 we focus on the relation between short interest and option 
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activity to test more directly who more informed traders are between short traders and option 
traders.  
In Panels A and B, we examine which group (i.e., short traders and option traders) is 
more informed using two-sided regressions. In Panel A, which uses the first differences of the 
variables in our VECM, OIRP and SIR Granger cause each other, but the net effect is not 
significant. This suggests that when we take into account the cointegration between the two 
variables, the net effect is not clear. In Panel B of Table 5, we examine the relation between SIR 
and OIRC. The results indicate that OIRC and SIR Granger cause each other, but the net effect is 
not significant. This suggests that when we take into the cointegration between the two variables, 
the net effect is not clear. Overall, short sales are not significantly affected by either put or call 
trades. 
In Panels C through F, we examine dynamic relations between short interest and option 
activity using conventional VAR based causality tests. In Panel C of Table 5, OIRP helps better 
predict SIR with a negative net effect (significant at the 1% level) on SIR. In Panel D, SIR helps 
better predict OIRP with an insignificant net effect on OIRP. Overall, for Panels C and D, OIRP 
helps better predict SIR with a net significant negative effect on SIR. 
In Panel E, we examine the ability OIRC to predict SIR. We find that OIRC helps better 
predict SIR with a negative net effect (significant at the 1% level). In Panel F, we examine the 
ability of SIR to predict OIRC. We find that SIR helps predict OIRC with an insignificant net 
effect. Overall, for Panels E and F, OIRC helps better predict SIR with a net negative effect on 
SIR.  
In Panels G and H, we examine the ability of O/S to predict SIR and the ability of SIR to 
predict O/S, respectively. We do not find a causal relation between O/S and SIR or between SIR 
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and O/S. Thus, the evidence suggests that option traders and short traders act independently of 
one another. 
 The results of Table 5 consistently indicate that option interest helps predict short 
activity, and that short activity helps predict option interest. We find that short activity decreases 
following an increase in option volume. However, when we consider either cointegration or both 
volume and price of options via the O/S measure, there is no longer a significant relation. 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
4.6. Tests of informedness based on trivariate models 
We extend the tests of Table 5 by including put, call, and short activity in our model at 
the same time. Note that we do not examine O/S in this table as it does not have a natural pair as 
is the case for puts and calls. The results are reported in Table 6. In Panel A of Table 6, neither 
OIRP nor OIRC helps predict SIR. Thus, when we include all three variables of interest, option 
activity does not have predictive power for short activity. 
In Panel B of Table 6, we find that both SIR and OIRC help predict OIRP, but the net 
effect is insignificant. In Panel C of Table 6, SIR helps predict OIRC, but its net effect is 
insignificant.  
When both types of option activity are included in the model with short activity, we find 
consistent results. Specifically, short interest helps predict option activity and option activity 
does not predict short interest. However, the lack of significance in the net effect yields no 
conclusions about which group is relatively more informed in this analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
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4.7. Robustness 
 We have conducted a battery of robustness tests. The results are not reported here, but are 
available upon request. Our robustness checks include: 1) different measures of option open 
interest, 2) using levels of non-stationary variables, and 3) using index level option volatility 
spreads. The alternate option open interest measures include total option open interest (call open 
interest plus put open interest) and net put open interest (put open interest less call open interest). 
Open interest results are qualitatively identical regardless of the measures used.  
Using the levels of non-stationary variables is less appropriate than the first-differenced 
results reported. Nonetheless, we have conducted all analyses using the levels of non-stationary 
variables. The results using levels are qualitatively different from those using first differences. 
Specifically, when using levels, the results indicate that option interest follows short interest. 
This would suggest that options traders take their cue from short traders in deciding when to 
trade. Thus, correctly controlling for the non-stationarity of option open interest proves to be 
critical.  
Finally, we examine index (S&P 500) level option volatility spreads as an additional 
measure of option activity. Results are generally similar to what we find for option open interest, 
but differ from our results using the ratio of option volume to stock volume. Specifically, we find 
that index level volatility spreads do not help better predict returns. We note that the issue of a 
possible complementary or substitute relation is not appropriate for index level data as several 
firms in the S&P 500 lack available traded options. Thus, the possibility to substitute from short 
interest to options or vice versa is not possible. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
We examine the dynamic relation between aggregate returns, short trading, and option 
activity in the U.S. over the period 1996-2009. Our goal is three-fold: 1) to determine whether 
short selling and option trading are substitutes or not, 2) to explore if the options market is non-
redundant to the equities market, and 3) to ascertain the relative informedness between short 
selling and option trading.  Counter to the findings of event studies around option listings, we 
find that short interest and option open interest are complements, not substitutes.  Thus, short 
sellers do not leave the equities market in preference for the options market.   
Additionally, consistent with the findings of Lamont and Stein (2004), the results suggest 
that, in aggregate, short sellers are generally momentum traders, as their activity responds to past 
negative return performance with increased short interest.  We add to the existing literature by 
showing aggregate option activity, like short selling, is also backward-looking.  Further results 
indicate that neither short interest nor option open interest contains information about future 
equity returns. However, when we employ the option-to-stock volume ratio (O/S) measure in our 
analysis we find that options traders are informed in that their activity helps predict future 
returns, while short interest still contains no return predictability. The O/S measure's return 
predictability indicates the options market contains information not present in the equities 
market.  Thus, taking all the evidence together, option traders are relatively more informed than 
both traditional equity and short traders, rendering the options market non-redundant and not a 
substitute for short selling.  
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Appendix A – Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
SIR Short interest as a % of shares outstanding 
RETURN Value-weighted return of S&P 500 firms with option and short data 
OIRP Total open interest of puts 
OIRC Total open interest of calls 
O/S Total dollar option volume divided by total dollar share volume 
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Table 1.   
 
Unit root tests: sample period, 1996:03 to 2009:12 (Observations 167) 
 
    (i)  Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression       
               
 
    (ii)   Phillips-Perron  regression  
      . 
 
 
variables ( ) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test 
 
Phillips-Perron test 
 
      
 
 
 
 
         
Z(tb) 
 
  
 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags  1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags 
 
RETURNt -8.762 -6.4823 -5.362 -4.850  -11.318 -11.292 -11.309 -11.344 
SIR t -1.348 -1.355 -1.447 -1.091  -1.478 -1.483 -1.497 -1.471 
  OIRP t -0.831 -0.485 -0.362 -0.363  -0.775 -0.686 -0.587 -0.532 
OIRCt -1.112 -0.787 -0.637 -0.629  -1.012 -0.947 -0.853 -0.790 
O/St -4.578 -3.737 -3.284 -2.859  -4.634 -4.475 -4.326 -4.217 
 
RESPt 
 
-3.744 
 
-3.850 
 
-3.309 
 
-3.007 
  
-3.422 
 
-3.554 
 
-3.531 
 
-3.458 
RESCt 
RES3t -8.762 -6.4823 -5.362 -4.850  -11.318 -11.292 -11.309 -11.344 
RESPCt -1.348 -1.355 -1.447 -1.091  -1.478 -1.483 -1.497 -1.471 
 
-3.877 
-3.651 
-2.362 
-3.941 
-3.774 
-2.399 
 
-3.347 
-3.263 
-2.111 
 
-2.857 
-3.03  
-2.6 1 
 
 -3.442 
-3.393 
-2.625 
 
-3.584 
-3.518 
-2.6  
 
-3.566 
-3.494 
-2.601 
 
-3.469 
-3.435 
-2.708 
 
Note:  
RETURNt = value weighted return of S&P 500 firms WITH option and short data (in other words, not all 
500 firms make it into this return calculation);  
SIRt = short interest as a %; OIRPt = total open interest of puts;  OIRCt = total open interest of calls; 
O/St =  total dollar option volume / total dollar share volume;  
RESPt = residual in the regression of SIRt on OIRPt;  RESCt = residual in the regression of SIRt on OIRCt; 
RES3t = residual in the regression of SIRt on OIRPt and OIRCt;  RESPCt = residual in the regression of 
OIRPt on OIRCt. 
Critical values of t-statistics for both  and Z(tb) are: 1%= -3.470 5%= -2.879 10%= -2.576 (Fuller 
(1976, Tables 8.5.1 and 8.5.2, pp. 371-373)). The details of the adjusted t-statistics Z(tb) can be found in 
the work of Phillips and Perron (1988).  
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Table 2.   Complements versus substitutes:  
 
          H0 (null hypothesis)          .                   Chi-square statistic               Significance level 
 
          H0 (null hypothesis)          sum of coeff.            t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
     (1) 
H0 :                  -0.0066                  t = -0.4238                                0.6717 
 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
SIR SIR OIRC b RESC    
 
             (1) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                 -0.0082                  t = -0.6519                                0.5145 
 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRP OIRP SIR b RESP    
 
             (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  4.9969                  t =1.8559                                  0.0635 
 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRC OIRC SIR b RESC    
 
                         (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  5.1121                  t =1.8628                                  0.0625 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRP OIRP OIRC b RESPC    
 
                         (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  0.9140                  t =6.7472                                  0.0000 
 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRC OIRC OIRP b RESPC    
 
             (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  1.2512                  t =6.4552                                  0.0000 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
SIR SIR OIRP   
 
            (1) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                 0.0055                  t = 2.3159                                0.0206 
3 3
1
1 0
*t j t j j t j t
j j
SIR SIR OIRP b RESP    
 
       
3
0
0.j
j



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         H0 (null hypothesis)          .                   Chi-square statistic               Significance level 
 
          H0 (null hypothesis)          sum of coeff.            t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
SIR SIR OIRC   
 
            (1) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                 0.0054                  t = 2.7182                                0.0066 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
OIRP OIRP SIR   
 
                                   (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  1.5947                  t =2.6626                                  0.0078 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
OIRC OIRC SIR   
 
           (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  1.5744                  t =2.6789                                  0.0074 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
OIRP OIRP OIRC   
 
           (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  0.0732                  t =2.0786                                  0.0377 
 
3 3
1 0
t j t j j t j
j j
OIRC OIRC OIRP   
 
           (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                  0.0967                  t =2.2293                                  0.0258 
 
3 3
1 0
/t j t j j t j
j j
SIR SIR O S   
 
                                     (1) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                   0.0012                  t = 0.7448                                0.4582 
 
3 3
1 0
/ /t j t j j t j
j j
O S O S SIR   
 
            (2) 
H0 :  
3
0
0.j
j


                 -11.4987                 t =-1.2915                                0.1965 
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Table 3   
Tests of the information content using Sims (1972) causality tests: 1996:04 to 2009:12 
(Observations 164) 
 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 Sims (1972) causality test for sample period, 1996:03 to 2009:12 (Observations 167) 
    
Panel A: tSIR  on RETURN  
 
                
3
3
Ret j t j
j
SIR turn  

   ,                         ( 13 ) 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 13.0547          0.0045 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.0065                t = -2.7721                                       0.0056 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3,                          χ
2
 (3) = 10.1286          0.0175 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                 0.0036                  t = 1.4798                                       0.1389 
 
 
Panel B: OIRP  on RETURN  
 
                
3
3
Ret j t j
j
OIRP turn  

   ,              ( 13 ) 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 8.4706          0.0372 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 0.0637                t = 1.5413                                         0.1232 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3,                          χ
2
 (3) = 3.7415          0.2908 
 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                 -0.0200                t = -0.6864                                       0.4925            
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          H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 Sims (1972) causality test for sample period, 1996:04 to 2009:12 (Observations 166) 
    
Panel C: OIRC  on RETURN  
 
                
3
3
Ret j t j
j
OIRC turn  

   ,             ( 13 ) 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 6.4240          0.0927 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 0.0674                t = 1.3734                                         0.1696 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3,                          χ
2
 (3) = 4.9826          0.1731 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                 -0.0534                t = -1.3985                                       0.1620 
 
 
Panel D: O/S on RETURN  
 
                
3
3
/ Ret j t j
j
O S turn  

  ,                                                           ( 13 ) 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 12.1652             0.0068 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.4492                t = -3.4187                                          0.0006 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3,                          χ
2
 (3) = 26.5361             0.0000 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                 -0.7706                 t =-5.0421                                          0.0000 
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Table 4   
Tests of the information content using causality tests: 1996:04 to 2009:12 (Observations 164) 
           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
   Panel A: RETURN regression 
   
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
Re Ret j t j j t j j t j j t j
j j j j
turn a turn b SIR c OIRP d OIRC    
   
           ,         
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 3.8251          0.2810 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 7.1230                t = 0.9761                                         0.3290 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 7.3732          0.0609 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


                 3.3378                  t = 2.2324                                       0.0256 
 
H0 :  jd  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 8.1579          0.0429 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
d


                 -3.2996                  t = -2.5305                                     0.0114 
Panel B: SIR regression 
   
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
Ret j t j j t j j t j j t j
j j j j
SIR a SIR b turn c OIRP d OIRC    
   
            ,  
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 11.8667          0.0079 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 -0.0046                t = -1.6554                                       0.0978 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                             χ
2
 (3) = 1.8499          0.6041 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


                 0.0159                  t = 0.4686                                       0.6394 
 
H0 :  jd  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 3.1210          0.3733 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
d


                 -0.0380                  t = -1.4154                                     0.1570 
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           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
            
Panel C: OIRP regression 
 
   
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
Ret j t j j t j j t j j t j
j j j j
OIRP a OIRP b turn c SIR d OIRC    
   
            ,  
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 11.8828          0.0078 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 0.0852                  t = 2.3684                                       0.0179 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 10.1624          0.0172 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


                 4.1973                  t = 1.8175                                       0.0691 
 
H0 :  jd  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 8.0929          0.0441 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
d


                 -0.0590                  t = -0.1508                                     0.8801 
 
 
Panel D: OIRC regression 
 
   
3 3 3 3
1 1 1 1
Ret j t j j t j j t j j t j
j j j j
OIRC a OIRC b turn c SIR d OIRP    
   
            ,  
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 8.3889          0.0386 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 0.0729                  t = 1.8089                                       0.0705 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 12.5125         0.0058 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


                 3.6938                  t = 1.3879                                       0.1652 
 
H0 :  jd  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 0.9037          0.8245 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
d


                 -0.0598                 t = -0.1006                                     0.9199 
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           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
Panel E: RETURN regression 
 
   
3 3 3
1 1 1
Re Re /t j t j j t j j t j
j j j
turn a turn b SIR c O S   
  
       ,   
                               
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 7.4290          0.0594 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 10.4694               t = 1.4203                                         0.1555 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) =15.9600          0.0012 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


               - 0.2096                 t =-3.2978                                        0.0010 
 
Panel F: SIR regression 
 
   
3 3 3
1 1 1
Re /t j t j j t j j t j
j j j
SIR a SIR b turn c O S   
  
        ,   
 
                                          
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 15.7666          0.0013 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 -0.0074                t = -3.0775                                       0.0021 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 2.4360          0.4870 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


                 -0.0008                t = -0.4982                                       0.6183 
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           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
Panel G: O/S regression 
  
     
3 3 3
1 1 1
/ / Re ,t j t j j t j j t j
j j j
O S a O S b turn c SIR   
  
              
   
                                                   
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 2.3216          0.5083 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

               - 0.0144                 t = -0.1146                                       0.9088 
 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 5.1887          0.1585 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c


               -16.0931                t = -2.2349                                      0.0254 
 
 
 
 
  
  41 
 
Table 5 
Tests of the information content using Sims (1972) causality tests: 1996:04 to 2009:12 
(Observations 164) 
 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 Sims (1972) causality test for sample period, 1996:03 to 2009:12 (Observations 167) 
  
Panel A: tSIR  on OIRP  
 
                
3
3
*t j t j t
j
SIR OIRP b RESP  

     ,     
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,  and b = 0                χ
2
 (4) = 12.4043         0.0146 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.0120                  t = -1.0040                                     0.3154 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3, and b = 0                χ
2
 (4) = 12.5855         0.0135 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                 0.0136                    t = 0.9548                                      0.3397 
 
 
Panel B: SIR on OIRC 
 
                
3
3
*t j t j t
j
SIR OIRC b RESC  

     ,     
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,  and b = 0                χ
2
 (4) = 10.2756                               0.0360 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.0143                 t = -1.3628                                     0.1729 
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = -1, -2, -3, and b = 0                χ
2
 (4) = 10.7714        0.0293 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j



                  0.0077                  t = 0.6815                                     0.4956 
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            H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 
 
Panel C: SIR on OIRP  
 
                
3 3
1
1 1
*t j t j j t j t
j j
SIR b SIR OIRP d RESP   
 
        ,         
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,   and d = 0,                χ
2
 (4) = 8.8444              0.0651 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.0358                t = -2.6707                                       0.0076 
 
 
Panel D: OIRP on SIR  
 
                
3 3
1
1 1
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRP b OIRP SIR d RESP   
 
        ,       
                
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (4) = 9.7231          0.0454 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 1.9720                t = 0.7675                                         0.4428 
 
 
Panel E: SIR on OIRC  
 
                
3 3
1
1 1
*t j t j j t j t
j j
SIR b SIR OIRC d RESC   
 
        ,  
 
        
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,   and d = 0,                χ
2
 (4) = 11.1793              0.0246 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 -0.0336                t = -2.9784                                       0.0029 
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           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 
 
 
Panel F: OIRC on SIR  
 
                
3 3
1
1 1
*t j t j j t j t
j j
OIRC b OIRC SIR d RESC   
 
        ,                       
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (4) = 11.3662          0.0227 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 1.6857                t = 0.6201                                         0.5352 
 
 
Panel G:  SIR on  O/S  
 
                
3 3
1 1
/t j t j j t j
j j
SIR b SIR O S  
 
      ,                                      
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                                χ
2
 (3) = 1.1289                 0.7701 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


                 0.0007                t = 0.4477                                         0.6544 
 
 
 
Panel H:  O/S on  SIR  
 
                
3 3
1 1
/ /t j t j j t j
j j
O S b O S SIR  
 
     ,           
 
H0 :  j  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,                            χ
2
 (3) = 4.5969          0.2038 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j


              -15.4969                t = -2.1111                                        0.0348 
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Table 6   
Tests of the information content using causality tests: 1996:05 to 2009:12 (Observations 164) 
 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
 
   Panel A: SIR regression 
 
   
3 3 3
1
1 1 1
* 3t j t j j t j j t j t
j j j
SIR a SIR b OIRP c OIRC d RES    
  
           ,                  
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,   and d = 0                 χ
2
 (4) = 4.9524          0.2992 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 0.0045                t = 0.1302                                         0.8964 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,     and d = 0               χ
2
 (3) = 6.2742          0.1796 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c

                 -0.0376                t = -1.3820                                       0.1670 
 
 
      Panel B: OIRP regression 
 
   
3 3 3
1
1 1 1
* 3t j t j j t j j t j t
j j j
OPENP a OIRP b SIR c OIRC d RES    
  
           ,                 
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,   and d = 0                 χ
2
 (4) = 10.5354          0.0323 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 2.0320                t = 0.8230                                         0.4105 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,     and d = 0               χ
2
 (3) = 8.8432          0.0651 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c

                 -0.1157               t = -0.2577                                        0.7967 
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            H0 (null hypothesis)            .                Chi-square statistic              Significance level 
 
           H0 (null hypothesis)        sum of coeff.           t-statistic                           Significance level 
 
    
   Panel C: OIRC regression 
 
   
3 3 3
1
1 1 1
* 3t j t j j t j j t j t
j j j
OIRC a OIRC b SIR c OIRP d RES    
  
           ,        
 
 
H0 :  jb  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,   and d = 0                 χ
2
 (4) = 11.3830          0.0226 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
b

                 1.8091                 t = 0.6594                                         0.5097 
 
H0 :  jc  = 0 for j = 1, 2, 3,     and d = 0               χ
2
 (3) = 1.5640          0.8152 
H0 :  
3
1
0.j
j
c

                 0.0987                  t = 0.1579                                       0.8745 
 
 
 
 
 
 
